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Abstract: The impact of COVID-19 on air transport is unprecedented and some well-
known airline brands may disappear as a result. Governments around the world have 
responded swiftly to cushion the financial impact by offering direct wage subsidies, 
tax relief, loans, etc. This paper explores the government’s appropriate responses to 
failing airlines’ bailout request by examining the case of Virgin Australia. Following 
the bailout policy principles established in the literature, we suggest that bankruptcy 
protection should be considered as the first solution to a failing carrier. A bailout 
decision should be guided by a set of principles and procedures, which should not be 
taken lightly. Our analysis also shows that the government cannot take a hands-off 
approach in the absence of private lenders and investors, as the costs to consumers 
and regional residents would be huge, at least in the short run, if the carrier could not 
get through the COVID-19 pandemic. A minimum level of assistance with conditions 
might be needed to maintain market competition.     
 












Since the 1980s, as with many other industries, publicly owned and operated national 
flag carriers have been fully or partially privatised across the world. Backx et al. 
(2002) note this was driven by the motivations of enhancing airline financial 
performance and operating efficiency. Since air transport has been deregulated, people 
believe that market forces have overall been working very well and that governments 
should stay out of commercial activities, unless the market has failed and there are no 
other options except for government intervention (Zhang et al., 2012). Even in the 
case of providing air services to remote communities, a competitive tendering 
procedure is followed to make more efficient use of public funds (Button, 2017). It 
has been widely agreed that a higher level of private and foreign ownership provides 
management with greater incentives to cut costs and enhance incentives (Zhang and 
Findlay, 2010). Empirical evidence has shown that private carriers perform better than 
state-owned carriers (Backx et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2019).  
 
However, air transport is highly cyclical and seasonal, and airline revenues can 
fluctuate widely in a business cycle (Zhang and Zhang, 2018). In fact, airlines are a 
service industry that requires significant capital investment, and shareholders do not 
normally receive a fair reward from investing in this industry (Pearce, 2018). 
Intermittent exogenous shocks such as terrorism attacks and pandemic diseases can 
easily kill an airline due to the low profit margin and high fixed costs associated with 
its operation. Instability seems inherent in this industry, resulting in frequent calls for 
intervention, or even reregulation. The term “bailout” is frequently heard during these 
shocks and other economic crises, particularly in the 2008-2009 global financial crisis 
and the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is considered as one of the biggest social and economic 
shock since the Great Depression. As governments started to impose restrictions 
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concerning human mobility and air travel,1 airlines saw their demand melt down 
almost immediately, and were forced into cancelling flights and grounding fleets (e.g., 
Abate et al., 2020; Sun et al., 2020). For instance, United Airlines announced on 
March 17, 2020 a 60% reduction in its April schedule – 42% in the US and Canada 
flights and 85% in international flights. On the same day, Qantas Group (Qantas and 
Jetstar) announced that their international capacity would be cut by 90% and domestic 
by 60% starting from the end of March, 2020. 
 
With revenues plummeting and the financial situation deteriorating, many 
governments have announced financial relief packages for airlines. For instance, the 
United States (US) has implemented the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act (CARES) stimulus package, which earmarks US$50 billion in loans and 
salary support for its passenger airlines. These relief programs can, among others, 
help airlines address their short-term liquidity issues. In Australia, the federal 
government’s support includes a $715 million package waiving fuel excise and 
government charges backdated to February 1, 2020.2 A further $198 million was set 
aside to ensure the continued operation of essential flights into regional communities 
and $100 million direct financial support for the smaller regional airlines. The 
JobKeeper wage subsidy program ($1,500 biweekly) was also available to businesses 
in the airline industry. However, like the US case the waiving of airways fees and 
charges can only be realised when flights are actually taking place. Hence, the 
assistance is not quite meaningful when almost all the flights are grounded (Tisdall 
and Zhang, 2020).   
  
Amid the escalation of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia shut its borders and then 
Australian states shut theirs in late March, 2020. Virgin Australia, the second largest 
                            
1 Studies have found that frequencies of air flights out of a heavily infected region are significantly associated 
with the number of COVID-19 cases in the destination regions (e.g., Christidis and Christodoulou, 2020; 
Gilbert et al., 2020; Pullano et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2020). 
2 $ means Australian dollar unless otherwise specified.                                       
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carrier in Australia, was the first casualty of the travel restrictions. This debt-laden 
carrier quickly ran out of cash reserves and had to put a request for a $1.4 billion 
bailout loan, which was rejected by the Australian federal government. Interestingly, 
Qantas openly expressed its opposition to any government assistance for Virgin 
Australia, claiming that this was time for the fittest to survive. Qantas did not need a 
government bailout this time, but it insisted that if there were any government 
assistance, it should be proportional: as Qantas’s revenue was three times higher than 
Virgin’s, it should have a $4.2 billion loan to level the playing field. This obviously 
complicated the government’s decision on whether or not to help. Eventually, the 
federal government refused to bailout Virgin Australia. The issue whether the 
government should give a hand to Virgin Australia or have a stake in an airline in 
financial distress has caught the attention of the general public in Australia and 
sparked much debate. This paper will document and examine this case with a set of 
bailout principles and conditions developed in the literature in a bid to show the 
significance of developing a bailout policy analytical framework for decision makers. 
In the next section, we draw literature on the debates on bailouts and government 
intervention in the air transport sector, followed by the methodology. The case of 
Virgin Australia is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review: the debates on bailouts and government intervention 
It is generally believed that unless there is market failure, the government should be 
refrained from adopting any public policy towards bailouts (Block, 1992). However, 
the notion of “too-big-to-fail” has led to taxpayer money being used to rescue some 
large financial firms that were considered to pose a huge risk to the entire economy 
upon failure (Block, 2010). The taxpayer money was also used to rescue non-financial 
firms, such as the financial aid provided to the airline industry to stabilise and sustain 
air transport post “9/11”. Although widely used, there is no strict definition for the 
term “bailout”. In most cases, this term refers to the government assistance offered to 
a private firm or private industry. However, Block (1992) distinguishes bailouts and 
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government general subsidies. The former aims to prevent the failure of a private 
enterprise or industry, while the latter intends to encourage a particular desired 
behaviour or favoured activity. Therefore, Block (1992, p.960) defines “bailout” as “a 
form of government assistance or intervention specifically designed or intended to 
assist enterprises facing financial distress and to prevent enterprise failure”. Similarly, 
Posner and Casey (2015, p. 487) define a bailout as “an ex post government transfer 
(a loan, cash, or other consideration) to an agent or group of agents to provide capital 
that is otherwise unavailable because of liquidity constraints”.   
 
There are good reasons for bailouts. Fu et al. (2010) and Zhang (2012) pointed out 
that the aviation sector imposes significant positive externalities to other industries. 
For example, Button et al. (1999) found that the presence of a hub airport could 
greatly increase high-tech employment by an average of 12,000 jobs in the airport 
catchment. Clearly a private investor is not likely to capture the full value from 
his/her investment into an airline. Therefore, air transport has been long regarded as a 
critical sector to the normal operation of an economy. In addition, although many 
bailout programs require large government expenditures, some bailout forms such as 
loan guarantee programs involve little or no government revenue (Block, 1992). 
There is also the case where the government loans to the failing firm could be repaid 
in full at a later time. However, Azgad-tromer (2017) pointed out that the positive 
externality argument may lead private investors to assume that taxpayers will most 
likely bail out a failing but socially important firm. The moral hazard problem can 
then arise as private investors may be more willing to invest in an airline at normal 
times and less willing to pour more money in to rescue it upon failure.  
 
Jedrychowski (2012) compared the measures used to mitigate the impact of “9/11” on 
the airline industry adopted by the US government and European Commission. The 
author found that the US government offered substantial short- and long-term support 
while the European Commission provided only limited supportive measures with a 
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purpose to encourage the industry to seek private restructuring alternatives. Although 
in the short run some national carriers in Europe failed, in the long run the whole 
aviation sector has sought to consolidate and returned to profitability (Jedrychowski, 
2012). In contrast, in the US, the direct aid helped keep all major US carriers out of 
bankruptcy in the short run, but in the long run, most airlines still chose to reorganise 
under Chapter 11. The author thus concluded that considering the historically difficult 
and cyclical nature of the airline industry, the government should refrain from 
providing direct financial support. Encouraging airlines to seek reorganisation under 
either bankruptcy or private measures should be a better option. 
 
If the government refrain from distributing money during the crisis, many airlines will 
have to seek merger and acquisition (M&A) to avoid bankruptcy, which will likely 
result in market concentration in the short-to-medium run (Ma et al., 2020). Some air 
transport economists have adopted the core theory to look at the unstable nature of the 
air transport market and argued for a lenient treatment to the increase in air transport 
concentration (Button, 1996, 2002, 2017; Button and Nijkamp, 1997; Antoniou, 
1998). Merger guidelines in many countries allow the approval of an anticompetitive 
merger if one of the merging parties is failing. This type of antitrust immunity granted 
constitutes a hidden or covert bailout (Block, 1992).     
 
According to Nyshadham and Raghavan (2001), buyers and sellers trading in a 
market tend to contract with each other and form groups called coalitions to achieve 
Pareto efficient outcomes. What the members of the coalitions get is called an 
allocation. A grand coalition is formed when each buyer and seller can maximise their 
gains. Such a grand coalition represents the existence of a core. If there is no 
allocation in the core, an empty core problem arises, which implies that a competitive 
equilibrium does not exist. Traders may find that they are better off in a sub-market. 
This condition is labelled by Telser (1987, 1994) as “chaos,” meaning that 




Telser (1978, 1996) claims that in the presence of relatively large fixed costs, 
avoidable costs, indivisibilities, or network effects, unrestricted competition cannot 
generate a stable efficient outcome, implying the existence of an empty core. Sjostrom 
(1986, 1993) and Pirrong (1992) suggest that large avoidable costs and finely 
divisible demand are possible causes for an empty core. Button (1996) notes that 
given the traffic density effect (that is, the unit costs of providing a service fall as the 
number of passengers carried on a route increases), operators have the incentive to cut 
prices to the marginal cost level in the face of the excess capacity. It is a frequent 
phenomenon that airlines cannot cover the full operating costs with such lower prices. 
The existence of an empty core would mean that Pareto efficiency is not achieved. 
Understanding the instability of airline industry may have resulted in a lenient 
antitrust policy towards the M&A and other consolidation activities in many countries 
(Button, 2017).  
 
However, some have argued that antitrust laws should not be silent to the 
consolidation and concentration trend. There is a school of thought arguing that 
antitrust laws are “more about ethics and equity than efficiency” (Bush, 2010, p.283). 
Indeed, too much consideration was given to the efficiency argument in the last few 
decades when antitrust bodies dealt with M&A cases (Zhang, 2015). Bush (2010) 
argued that even if efficiency exists, it is not worth much if it is not distributed to 
consumers. The author warned that using consolidations to save the industry during 
economic crises may create long-term harm to consumers. In addition, consolidations 
may create a too-big-to-fail situation that may require further consolidations to rescue 
the industry in the future. Therefore, there has been significant controversy on the 
lenient treatment towards M&A even in the period of the economic crisis.  
 
 
It should be recognised that practically there is no single bailout policy for the airline 
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industry across countries. This has been evident during the COVID-19 pandemic 
during which the relief measures include tax deferment, waiver of individual taxes, 
provision of grants and loans, capital injection, etc (see, e.g., Nhamo et al., 2020; 
European Commission, 2021). The packages of some countries are more generous 
than those of others. It seems that there are few disputes over the state aid to the 
aviation industry as a whole, given that this industry is one of the most affected 
sectors in the pandemic. It is the assistance to the induvial carrier, or the firm-specific 
bailout that has raised concerns. For example, Ryanair has constantly fought against 
the state aid given to some flag carriers such as KLM and TAP in the court, arguing 
that the financial aid for these airlines would reward inefficiency and encourage unfair 
competition. Some of these challenges have been successful (Chee, 2021).3 Although 
some air transport economists call for a special treatment to the airline industry 
considering its positive externality and inherent instability, the mainstream view in the 
law and economic literature contends that the bailout policy for a failing firm should 
be only used under extreme and specialised circumstances and that each bailout 
request should be examined on a case-by-case basis, following agreed assessment 
processes and principles (Posner and Casey, 2015).  
 
The increasing presence of governments in the air transport industry will undoubtedly 
raise the debates on the issues of airline ownership, air transport deregulation, and 
environmental sustainability of this sector (Abate et al., 2020). It also gives the 
governments the chance to exercise politic influence and reshuffle airlines’ strategies, 
thereby potentially changing the competitive field in the post pandemic period (Albers 
and Rundshagen, 2020). It should be noted that most of the existing studies on airline 
                            
3 These days, many countries have multiple carriers. The favouritism to one particular carrier, such as the flag carrier 
that is partly or fully owned by the government, would create an uneven playing field and distort 
competition in the long run. One example is South African Airways, a state-owned airline that has been 
constantly receiving bailouts since the 1990s. However, this carrier has been labelled as an overstaffed, 
inefficient carrier that does not have the incentive to pursue profitability (Tleane, 2020). Therefore, the 
bailouts were a waste of taxpayers’ money with no return. 
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bailouts do not intend to establish a comprehensive bailout policy analytical 
framework or guidelines for governments. This research aims to fill this gap. By 
examining the case of Virgin Australia, we can assess if the Australian government’s 
response to its bailout request is appropriate and what policies need to be developed to 
help the failing carriers in the future. The findings of this research will shed light on 
similar cases that might occur in other countries.    
    
3. Methodology 
A case study method is used in this research. Case study research is described as 
qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 1998). Maxwell and Chmiel (2014) claim that case 
study is the most commonly used method to preserve contextual information in 
qualitative research, which can provide a broader insight into the research questions. 
The case study materials regarding Virgin Australia were drawn from its annual 
financial reports, government reports, and Australian major news websites including 
news.com.au, theaustralian.com.au, sbs.com.au, and abc.com.au. The opinions of the 
Aviation Management Major students were also consulted when they were taking the 
“Aviation Economics” course at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia, in 
Semester 2, 2020. Most of these students have already had a job in the airline 
industry. Their opinions were expressed in the course StudyDesk forums as well as 
the assignments submitted.     
 
The analysis of the case study follows the analytical framework of the public bailout 
policy developed in Block (1992) and Posner and Casey (2015), which include the 
following key steps and principles:   
 
i. The presumption against bailout should be firmly established except in rare 
and specialised circumstances.  




• A private firm seeking bailout assistance needs to demonstrate that its failure 
is due to circumstances beyond its control. The wrongdoers should bear the 
costs. However, the no-fault requirement is not an argument for bailout. 
• Public bailouts should not be considered before various forms of private 
bailouts are attempted first. This may include a Chapter 11 type bankruptcy 
reorganisation or other efforts in the private markets.  
• Before the bailout relief can be considered, it should be expected that the 
failing firm would collapse without the government assistance.     
iii. Even if the above conditions are met, the presumption against bailout should 
remain until the impact of “not to intervene” is assessed. The public interest 
test should be applied. The short-run costs and long-run implications due to 
the loss of the troubled firm needs to be considered. 
iv. Even if the bailout seems appropriate, other considerations need to be taken 
into account including the moral hazard and equity issues, and alternative 
policies should be explored.   
v. Some procedural principles should be followed including public hearing and 
judicial involvement. 
Based on these principals, a typical bailout process can be illustrated with 8 steps in 
Figure 1. The bailout request can be rejected at any step if the above principles are not 













4. The case study of Virgin Australia  
4.1 Australian aviation policy and government’s attitude towards airline failure  
From the 1950s to 1990, Australia’s domestic market was governed by the “two 
airlines” policy. Two domestic airlines served the routes between state capital cities 
and some regional routes with identical planes, schedules, and prices with each airline 
holding approximately 50% of the market share (Quiggin 1997; Zhang et al., 2017).4 
Douglas (1993) claimed that the Australian domestic market is a natural duopoly, 
suggesting that the market is not big enough to support more than two carriers. This 
claim seems to be true in the post-deregulation period as the market continued to be a 
duopoly, but on a dynamic process with some airlines ceasing operation and being 
replaced by new ones (Forsyth, 2017). For example, after the two-airline policy was 
abolished in 1990, Australia’s domestic market was largely dominated by Ansett and 
Qantas in the 1990s. The first low-cost carrier (LCC) Compass I was established in 
1990 but quickly failed, as did Compass II. Impulse Airlines was established in 1992 
                            
4 The Australian Standard Geographical Classification (ASGC) Remoteness Structure divides the nation into five 
categories: major cities, inner regional Australia, outer regional Australia, remote Australia, and very 
remote Australia (Zhang et al., 2017). The last four categories are broadly called regional area.  Regional 
aviation services refer to the air transport activities between regional areas or between regional areas and 
capital cities. 
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as an independent airline, but was eventually acquired by Qantas in 2001. Virgin Blue 
entered as an LCC in 2000. With the demise of Ansett in 2001, Virgin Blue had the 
opportunity to grow rapidly and became a key competitor in the domestic market. The 
passenger traffic carried by Virgin Blue increased from 3 million in 2002 to about 20 
million in 2005. As a response, Qantas launched an LCC subsidiary, Jetstar, in 2003, 
which is called an airline-within-airlines (AinA) strategy. The launch of Jetstar 
contained the expansion of Virgin Blue. The joining of another LCC in 2007, Tiger, in 
the Australian domestic market further limited its growth. An ambitious Game Change 
Program was implemented in 2010 aiming to transform itself to a full service carrier 
(FSA) with a new name, Virgin Australia. It followed the AinA strategy by taking 
over Tiger (rebranded as Tigerair) in 2013 and fully owned this LCC from 2014. 
However, since the takeover, Virgin Australia has been suffering continuous losses. 
Both Qantas and Virgin Australia recorded heavy losses in 2013/2014 after they 
engaged in capacity or price wars (Ma et al., 2019). The loss to Qantas was the largest 
loss in its history, which prompted its bailout request for a $2.7 billion unsecured 
loan. 
The government rejected this request. Instead, the government decided to abolish/ease 
foreign ownership restrictions imposed on Qantas to help Qantas. Qantas was 
privatised in 1994, but this was an incomplete privatisation. The old Qantas Sale Act 
did not allow any single airline investor to hold more than 25% of Qantas and any 
single foreign airline investor to hold more than 35%, capping the total foreign 
investment at 49%. In July 2014, the government revised the Act and capped foreign 
ownership at 49%, with no airline restrictions. Qantas welcomed the foreign 
ownership relaxation, but said it was not enough. In fact, this was a compromised 
outcome. Most Australians would not want to see Qantas go bankrupt. Many people 




The company needs to be put on a sounder footing, serving the broader needs of the 
Australian people. In my judgment there is a strong case for returning the airline to 
public ownership… There are precedents for re-nationalisation, e.g. New Zealand’s 
national carrier. To return QANTAS to public ownership would incur the cost of 
buying out shareholders, but the current low price of those shares makes this 
affordable. Indeed, the cost could be less than the taxpayer cost of the unemployment 
benefits and other social service payments that would result from the company’s 
currently proposed downsizing and its possible demise. Government borrowing, at the 
currently low interest rates, could finance the purchase of the approximately $2 
billion share capital, which is a relatively small one-off cost compared with other 
government outlays…  
Fortunately, after restructuring the organisation and taking strict cost control 
measures, Qantas quickly returned to profitability in 2015 and the following years, but 
Virgin Australia continued to report losses. The travel restrictions to contain COVID-
19 were the final straw for Virgin Australia. The Australian federal government had a 
request from Virgin for a $1.4 billion bailout. However, this request was rejected 
probably because the federal government believed that the industry-wide assistance 
was enough for the industry to survive. Also it might not be fair to Qantas if only 
Virgin Australia was given additional assistance. The rejection was also reasonable 
considering that Virgin Australia had not sought bankruptcy protection according to 
the preconditions listed in the previous section.  
   
Virgin Australia could not count on its major shareholders, as most of them are 
airlines who were also in financial difficulty. Singapore Airlines, Etihad, Chinese 
groups Nanshan and HNA, and Richard Branson's Virgin Group jointly hold 90% of 
Virgin Australia’s shares. Many people thus regarded Virgin Australia as a foreign 
carrier that should not be helped with the Australian taxpayer’s money. After the 
government rejected its final plea for $200 million in assistance, Virgin Australia went 
into voluntary administration (similar to the US Chapter 11) on April 21, 2020, 
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affecting 10,000 staff and 6,000 contractors. It was later revealed that this carrier 
owed more than $6.8 billion to more than 12,000 creditors, including employees, 
banks, aircraft financiers and landlords.  
 
Interestingly, the Queensland state government was keen to save Virgin Australia. It 
called for the federal government to step in, and expressed its intention to put a $200 
million bid on the carrier in the form of a direct equity stake, a loan, guarantee or 
other financial incentives. This is understandable as Virgin Australia was 
headquartered in Brisbane, Queensland and employed about 5,000 Queenslanders. 
Queensland is different from other states. It has significant tourism assets scattered 
across the state. Tourism has been the primary industry for many regional towns. Air 
transport is vitally important in supporting the recovery and growth of the tourism 
industry and the large number of jobs in this industry. Button (2017) argues that 
airports, air navigation service providers, airframe and aero-engine manufacturers and 
global distribution systems rely on airlines to generate the revenues on which they in 
turn rely. It is also Queensland government’s view that supporting Virgin Australia 
will not only help retain its head office and crew staff in Queensland, but also grow 
jobs in the repairs, maintenance and overhaul sector and support both direct and 
indirect jobs in the tourism industry (Lynch, 2020).  
 
There were about 20 private investors that showed interests in purchasing this carrier. 
Brookfield Asset Management, Ben Gray's BGH Capital and its partner 
AustralianSuper, Bain Capital, US-aviation firm American Indigo Partners and private 
equity investor Cyrus Capital Partners were in the final bidding race for Virgin 
Australia. Eventually, the Boston-based global investment firm, Bain Capital became 
the new owner of Virgin Australia with a bid of $3.5 billion. The Queensland 
government and Bain Capital has agreed in principal to keep Virgin Australia’s 




Due to the downsizing of fleet size and withdrawal of Tigerair, Virgin Australia’s 
market share fell from 38% in December 2019 to 24% in December 2020 (Thomas, 
2021). However, under the new ownership of Bain Capital, it managed to increase its 
domestic share to 28% in March 2021. It then planned to return to 80% of its pre-
pandemic capacity by June 2021, though this goal was disrupted when Sydney went 
into lockdown again in June 2021 and Melbourne in July 2021. However, with many 
Australian states promising to reopen their borders when vaccination rates reach 80%, 
Virgin Australia vowed to regain a one-third share of the domestic market by the end 
of 2021 (Freed, 2021).  
 
The different attitudes of the two levels of government in Australia represent the 
divided opinions among Australian people towards the fate of Virgin Australia. 
Following the bailout policy principles established in Block (1992), we attempt to 
answer the following questions and see if a bailout for Virgin Australia is justified. 
 
4.2 What have caused the failure of Virgin Australia? 
It is one of the preconditions set by Block (1992) that before government intervention 
is considered, Virgin Australia needs to show that its failure was purely caused by 
COVID-19 and other factors beyond its control. If the failure is a result of the long-
standing mismanagement, financial help is not justified as the poor management 
should not be rewarded.  
 
The decisions of rebranding itself as an FSA, acquiring Tigerair and participating in 
international services have been blamed to have cost the airline too much, resulting in 
continuous losses. These claims are partly true. Table 1 presents the segment results of 
Virgin Australia that may help assess the financial performance of the individual 
segments within the airline group. As can be seen, Virgin Australia actually made 
money in the domestic market as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) recorded 
positive values in the past few years. However, Tigerair and Virgin Australia 
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International operations reported negative numbers. Given that Tigerair has never 
been able to make a profit, it is unlikely for Virgin Australia to use it as a strategic 
asset to fight against Qantas. Some people argue that Virgin Australia should have 
never bought it in the first place. It has been suggested that Tiger brand does not have 
the same value as the Virgin, meaning that Tigerair should be a product of Virgin 
Australia rather than a separate airline (News.com.au, 2019).           
 
Table 1. Virgin Australia segment results  
Revenue and income  2019 2018 2017 2016 
Domestic ($ million)  3,914.9 3,682.0 3,439.6 3,445.6 
International ($ million) 1,304.8 1,120.3 999.0 1016.3 
Tigerair ($ million) 563.4 570.6 543.6 475.9 
Segment EBIT     
Domestic ($ million) 133.4 215.8 92.9 162.0 
International ($ million) （75.6） （21.7） 0.5 (48.8) 
Tigerair ($ million) （45.0） （39.5） (24.3) 2.2 
Source: Virgin Australia annual financial reports 
  
Virgin Australia had a limited international network with flights from Brisbane, 
Sydney and Melbourne to New Zealand and the South Pacific as well as a few 
destinations in Asia and North America. However, most of these international routes 
did not make money. International air transport markets to/from Australia were very 
competitive with 95 airlines operating scheduled services in early 2020. Unlike 
Qantas that has established a hub-and-spoke system in Sydney to increase its 
international passengers at lower operating costs, Virgin Australia has failed to do the 
same. It has been suggested that Virgin Australia consider closing most of its 
international services to improve profitability. Overall, although a series of bad 
management decisions may have led to the failure of Virgin, this does not mean that it 
has lost all hope to return to profitability, considering its reasonable performance in 
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the domestic market. Therefore, we cannot exclude the bailout option simply based on 
the mismanagement claim.        
 
4.3 Are the costs of losing Virgin Australia significant? 
In all cases, a strong public interest test needs to be established for the bailout to go 
ahead as noted in the methodology section. It is not appropriate if the bailout just 
benefits Virgin Australia’s debtors, shareholders, management and employees. The 
benefits to the wider community need to be identified.  
 
From the consumers’ perspective, keeping Virgin Australia alive is in their interest in 
that having two airlines promotes competition. It took more than ten years for Virgin 
Australia to become an effective challenger to Qantas. In fact, the Qantas Group still 
holds two thirds of the market share and is dominant on many routes. With the demise 
of Air Berlin in 2017, significant anticompetitive concerns have been raised in 
Grosche et al. (2020) as the Lufthansa Group became more dominant in the German 
market. In the Australian domestic market, if Virgin fails, there will be airlines to 
enter in the long run, but it will take a long time for the new carrier to be an effective 
challenger. So for a significant amount of time, Qantas may enjoy a monopoly status. 
The likely detrimental effect can be seen from the pricing dynamics between Qantas 
and Virgin Australia. Ma et al. (2019) reported that Qantas and Virgin closely matched 
each other’s prices over years as shown in Figure 2. This figure also shows that Jetstar 
charged a higher price than Tigerair before 2016, implying that Qantas used Jetstar as 
a fighting brand against other LCCs to retrain the Qantas Group’s 65% market share 
goal. This suggests that despite Qantas Group’s dominant market share, it did not 
command price leadership in the presence of Virgin Australia. Instead, Qantas and 
Jetstar adjusted their prices significantly in response to Virgin’s pricing dynamics 
(Zhang et al., 2018).  
 
In the domestic market, Qantas’ AinA strategy has been quite successful. The AinA 
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strategy has allowed the extensive capture of consumer surplus of the segmented 
customer groups to maximise Qantas profits by product differentiation. In August 
2017, of Australia’s top 144 domestic route markets in terms of passenger traffic 
volume (each direction of a route is classified as a separate market), Qantas and 
Jetstar were simultaneously present in 95 of these markets, while Virgin and Tigerair 
were both present in 75 markets. All four carriers were competing in 71 of the 144 
markets. These observations suggest that Virgin Australia was an effective competitor 
and constraint to Qantas in suppressing domestic airfares. Its wide presence is 
unlikely to be replaced by a new carrier any time soon. The AinA strategy adopted by 
Qantas has successfully defended its 65% market share bottom-line and put Virgin 
Australia in financial stress. It is expected that this strategy would also make it 
difficult for any new entrants to succeed if Virgin Australia were to exit.     
 
Regional Australia benefits from the competition. Ma et al. (2019) note that the 
occurrence of price wars between Qantas and Virgin Australia could be nationwide, 
including routes to/from regional areas. For example, in 2017, Qantas cut airfares 
across the country including flights to/from Rockhampton as part of their “Fly Away 
Sale”. The price cuts were immediately matched by Virgin Australia. Regional 
Australia accounts for one third of Australia’s population and contributes significantly 
to the national economy (Zhang et al., 2017). In the last decade or so, many regional 
areas in Australia have become increasingly dependent on the tourism and mining 
industries, which rely heavily on reliable and affordable air services. Virgin Australia 
provides essential services into some well-known tourism destinations in Queensland 
including Cairns, Gold Coast, Airline Beach, Hamilton Island, Sunshine Coast, 
Hervey Bay, Mackay and Townsville. In recent years, there have been increasing 
complaints about the high regional route airfare by Australian regional residents, 
which prompted a Senate inquiry into the air services in regional, rural and remote 
Australia (The Senate, 2019). A loss of a major player like Virgin Australia could 
result in an even higher travel cost burden for regional residents. Abate et al. (2020) 
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argue that the government needs to balance its obligations of maintaining basic and 
essential connectivity against the use of private capital and expertise to save the 







 Figure 2. Monthly average airfares between Qantas and Virgin Groups 
 
Source: Ma et al. (2018). 
 
Both monopoly power and the lack of sufficient private provision of air services 
(owing to its positive external effects) are a kind of market failure, which may justify 
government intervention. However, it is understood that Australia has done away with 
the idea of nationalisation for many years.5 The government did not bailout Ansett in 
                            
5 Nationalisation of airlines again was called for to help airlines to survive the impact of the pandemic 
in other countries. However, this has never been an option for Virgin Australia that is not 






































































2001, but at that time, Virgin Blue had been in operation for one year as an LCC and 
was able to fill the void left by Ansett, eventually forcing Qantas to launch its own 
LCC, Jetstar, in 2003. However, the business travel market was still a monopoly until 
Virgin shifted to the FSA model, which represented a welfare loss to business 
travellers for a long time. Sciberras (2020) argues that it took Virgin Blue more than 
ten years to build the necessary infrastructure and products such as their frequent flyer 
program and business lounges to allow it to effectively compete against Qantas in the 
business and corporate market. This transformation required a huge investment, which 
contributed partly to Virgin Australia’s losses in the last seven years.  
4.4 Are there alternative solutions except for public bailouts? 
The government consistently refused to bail out Qantas in 2014. The alternative 
measure, i.e., relaxing foreign-ownership restriction were used to help Qantas receive 
fund injections from many interested investors around the world. However, when 
COVID-19 hit the world in 2020, the impact was across the board and far longer and 
deeper than any other exogenous shock. It was not known if the private market could 
provide a solution that helped avoid a Qantas monopoly. 
Fortunately, the long list of potential bidders indicated that Virgin Australia was a 
commercial proposition and the government intervention could be avoided and kept at 
a minimum level. The eventual sale of Virgin Australia to Bain Capital is great news 
to consumers, airline employees and the governments at both levels. However, some 
3,000 jobs will have to go, mainly due to the indefinite suspension of the long-haul 
international routes, the cessation of its LCC brand Tigerair and suspension of some 
regional routes. This outcome suggests that Australia’s air transport sector is resilient 
and adaptable, and that the private market can provide a solution to a failing airline in 
this pandemic crisis. Therefore, it seems that the government should not rush to save 
an airline by providing direct aid in the first instance. Airlines can be allowed to 
restructure and downsize to adjust themselves to the new normal. Any government 
assistance including the $200 million pledge to Virgin Australia should not delay the 
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needed restructuring in the industry.6 In fact, even with government assistance, job 
losses are still unavoidable if Virgin Australia wants to return to profitability. 
Therefore, preserving jobs alone is not a sufficient excuse to bail out the carrier, 
especially when the opportunity cost of the bailout fund is considered.   
Does this imply that a hands-off approach should be adopted by the government? The 
answer is certainly no. The government should first consider the causes of the failure 
and assess if there are solutions from the private market. Virgin Australia could 
generate substantial revenue from the domestic market. However, until October 2020, 
domestic borders remained closed between some states. This has worsened the 
financial positions of both Qantas and Virgin Australia. Lifting the travel restrictions 
between states was something that the federal government could do to assist the 
airline industry. In addition, the government can simplify and expedite the insolvency 
process for failing companies by adopting some elements of the US Chapter 11 
bankruptcy regime. Currently a failing company will be handed over to an external 
administrator and a shift to the debtor in possession regime will give financially 
distressed companies more flexibility to restructure.  
If no private sale deal could be reached in the Virgin Australia case, should the 
government provide direct financial support? There is no easy answer. People may 
argue that any financial aid will create unfairness that would benefit the creditors and 
shareholders of a mismanaged business whose collapse may not have serious 
macroeconomic consequences like a big financial firm. However, considering Virgin 
Australia’s relatively strong performance in the domestic market, its significance to 
consumers and regional communities, and the low confidence towards airline industry 
from the lenders and investors in the pandemic, individualised rescue programs could 
be considered with some conditions including the repayment of the taxpayer money at 
a later time and some political objectives such as servicing some thin regional routes 
                            
6 Therefore, if needed, the most appropriate timing for the government intervention might be after private solutions 
including bankruptcy reorganisation, have been sought and failed including.  
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(Albers and Rundshagen, 2020). There is risk, as the government assistance required 
by Virgin Australia is not a small amount, which may force the government to cut 
expenditures on other projects. However, compared with the costs of losing an 
effective competitor, it may be still relatively small and most likely it can be a one-off 
cost if the COVID-19 pandemic can be contained and economic conditions improve 
in the near future. However, the bailout decision should not be taken in a rush. A 
public hearing might be needed to have the voices of different stakeholders heard. 
5. Conclusion 
The impact of COVID-19 on air transport is unprecedented and the future of many 
airlines remain uncertain. Governments around the world have responded quickly to 
cushion the financial impact by offering direct wage subsidies, tax relief, loans, etc. 
This paper presents a case study on whether the Australian government should save 
Virgin Australia. The outcome suggests that the private market can provide a solution 
without government intervention for the case of Virgin Australia, which is consistent 
with the widely held view that the government should refrain from giving direct 
financial aid to a failing firm. However, our analysis also shows that if the private sale 
deal were not realised, the cost would be huge in terms of (for example) the interests 
of Australian consumers and regional communities. A minimum level of assistance 
with conditions can be considered to restore competition in Australian domestic 
market and maintain air transport connectivity for regional areas. These conditions 
can include high interest rates and other penalties to bring some pains for creditors 
and shareholders (Posner and Casey, 2015). Our analysis has shown that Virgin 
engaged in some risky investment activities in the last ten years. These conditions will 
deter the airline from taking on excessive risk in the future. 
 
Traditionally the term “too big to fail” is linked to the banking sector where a big 
financial firm would not be allowed to fail. However, research has shown that there is 
no evidence that a failure of one financial institution could collapse the whole financial 
system and the economy (Moosa, 2010). Similarly, the consequence of the failure of an 
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airline is at best short run and limited, particularly in a market where entry and exit 
barriers have been largely lifted. In fact, it is difficult to apply the “too big to fail” 
doctrine to Virgin Australia that only commanded 38% of the market share before the 
onset of Covid-19. It is also noticed that although the impact of Covid-19 pandemic on 
the economy and air transport may exceed that of any previous crisis, the global share 
markets have performed strongly since mid-2020, suggesting that investors are 
confident about the economic recovery ahead. In the meantime, during the pandemic, 
people have had an increased desire to travel, especially the desire to visit friends and 
families (Krishnan et al., 2021). This implies that there would be investors who are 
willing to take the risk and grip opportunities to invest in airlines. Therefore, private 
solutions should be sought first before the taxpayer money is used.      
 
It is always difficult to make a bailout decision. As noted by Block (1992), 
governments should treat bailouts as extraordinary events, which should not be lightly 
undertaken. Government interventions can increase political influences in the 
organisation which may not benefit their long-term survival (Habersang et al., 2019). 
The case of Virgin Australia presented in this paper further shows the significant role 
played by the bankruptcy protection in helping failing firms to reorganise and 
restructure, which should be considered as the first solution. A detailed economic 
analysis regarding the cost and benefit is certainly needed to establish a strong public 
interest argument before the bailout decision is made. Other considerations such as 
the effects of moral hazard and rewarding mismanagement might be equally 
important. As the literature on airline bailout guidelines remains scarce, researchers 
can examine more bailout cases during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis to establish a 
strong analytical framework to inform the government’s bailout policy towards the air 
transport sector.   
 
Finally, we should point out that except their key role in transporting essential goods 
and medical supplies, the importance of Qantas and Virgin Australia to the economy 
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has declined since the country has closed its border to other countries, as Australia has 
taken an elimination strategy in the fight against Covid-19 (Tisdall et al., 2021). Its 
international border remained closed in September 2021. Many Australian states and 
territories also closed their borders to passengers from another state where community 
transmission is not controlled. Qantas and Virgin Australia are not expected to resume 
their international flights by the end of 2021. The border closures may have affected 
the bailout policy as restoring passenger travel is certainly not a priority agenda of the 
government. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Australian federal government 
may see that the border closures provide a time window for Virgin Australia to seek 
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